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Abstract 
 
We use a rich personnel data set from a Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 to 
analyze how the financial crisis in 1998 and the resulting change in external labor 
market conditions affect the wages and the welfare of workers inside a firm. We 
provide evidence that large shocks to external conditions affect the firm’s personnel 
policies, and show that the burden of the shock is not evenly spread across the 
workforce. The firm takes advantage of a high-inflationary environment and of a fall 
in workers’ outside options after the financial crisis and cuts real wages. Earnings are 
curbed most for those who earned the highest rents, resulting in a strong compression 
of real wages. The fact that real wages and real compensation levels never recovered 
to pre-crisis levels even though the firm’s financial situation was better in 2002 than 
before the crisis and the differential treatment of employee groups within the firm can 
be taken as evidence that market forces strongly influence the wage policies of our 
firm. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Observing how a firm adjusts its personnel policies in response to a large shock can 
yield vital insights about the nature of adjustment processes in labor markets. We 
analyze a rich personnel data set from a Russian firm for a period (1997 to 2002) that 
spans the Russian financial crisis in 1998, in order to shed light on crucial, but largely 
unresolved questions about the functioning of labor markets in general. For example, 
do firms adapt their wage policy to changes in labor market conditions? And if so, are 
all workers affected in the same way, or are incumbent workers shielded from 
external labor market shocks as early theoretical work on internal labor markets 
suggests (see Doeringer and Piore, 1971)?1  
In particular, we investigate how the firm adjusts employment, wages and 
other components of pay in response to the crisis, and study how the burden of the 
crisis is spread across the workforce. The very detailed information on employee 
remuneration and wage arrears enables us to provide a much clearer and more 
complete description of the mechanisms that are used to adjust earnings at the firm 
level than is typically possible. Such an analysis is important for at least two reasons: 
First, despite some attempts in the literature to assess the costs of economic crises on 
workers and on households (see, for example, Fallon and Lucas, 2002), we know 
virtually nothing of how these costs are distributed among employees inside firms 
during such dramatic macroeconomic upheavals. Second, although several studies 
have explored to what extent internal labor markets cushion incumbent workers from 
external labor market shocks (e.g., Baker et al., 1994, Lazear, 1999; Lazear and Oyer, 
2004), it is still not well understood how workers’ welfare is affected by firm 
                                                 
1 Doeringer and Piore (1971, p. 2) argue that workers in jobs that are filled by promotion or transfer 
from within are “shielded from the direct influence of competitive forces in the external market”, but 
that the internal and external labor markets are connected at the ports of entry. 
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performance over the business cycle. Evidence on the degree to which firms are 
disciplined by external labor market conditions is mixed. Baker et al. (1994) find that 
workers are partly shielded against adverse shocks to external market conditions.2 
Lazear and Oyer (2004) find that external market conditions affect wages over the 
long run in the Swedish labor market. The picture that emerges in the empirical 
literature suggests (1) that hiring wages track industry wages, but (2) that differences 
in hiring wages are persistent; indicating that market induced variations in marginal 
productivity are not fully reflected in wages of incumbent workers.  
The empirical literature has found it difficult so far to establish a direct link 
between shocks to (external) labor market conditions and changes of firm’s personnel 
policies. This is because shocks have typically been small in most advanced Western 
economies during the last decades. If firms gradually adjust their personnel policies in 
response to such small but relatively frequent changes in external conditions, the 
impact of small shocks is typically difficult to measure and hardly observable in 
available data. If firms, on the other hand, sporadically react to accumulated shocks 
by major adjustments (see, e.g., Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996), it is difficult for 
researchers to relate such a policy change to a particular external shock. Therefore, 
there is much insight to be gained by assessing how firms react to larger exogenous 
macroeconomic shocks, such as the financial crisis that occurred in Russia in 1998.3 
This crisis had severe consequences, leading to a substantial devaluation of the Ruble, 
a collapse of a large part of the private banking sector, a surge in inflation and interest 
rates, and liquidity problems, which adversely affected demand in the goods market. 
                                                 
2 Baker et al. (1994) find cohort effects in starting wages which persist, implying that incumbent 
workers in their internal labor market are (partly) shielded from shocks to the marginal product. 
3 Large macroeconomic shocks are more frequently observed in developing and emerging economies. 
Other examples include the financial crises in Latin America and Asia in the 1990s. 
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Our results show that these changes in economic conditions strongly influence 
the personnel policies of our firm. Real wages and real compensation fell substantially 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Employment levels at the firm, on the other 
hand, remained rather stable.4 The downward adjustment of earnings leads to 
persistent welfare losses among employees since real wages and real compensation 
levels had not recovered to pre-crisis levels by 2002, even though the firm’s financial 
situation was then better than before the crisis. These welfare losses were, however, 
not spread evenly across all employees. In fact, employees at the top of the earnings 
distribution tend to take the highest real wage cuts in relative terms, which is in part 
driven by external labor market conditions that limit the scope for cutting wages of 
employees at the bottom end of the firm’s wage distribution. External conditions also 
appear to affect the firm’s recruitment policy as hiring wages track market wages.  
The firm, which was a high-wage firm prior to 1998, makes use of the high 
inflation that manifests during the financial crisis in order to extract rents from 
employees. It curbs earnings most for those who earned the highest rents, which 
results in a tremendous compression of real wages. Our findings also indicate that 
employees with long tenure have lower nominal wage growth, but face fewer wage 
arrears.5 The firm seemed to burden accounting staff with a disproportionate share of 
the costs of the crisis, as evidenced in a much higher incidence of wage arrears in 
1998 than for other job categories and relatively low nominal wage growth between 
1997 and 2002. It is possible that this personnel policy was a reaction to a rather loose 
                                                 
4 A policy that relies on “price” rather than “quantity” adjustments in response to adverse shock is 
typical for the Russian economy (see Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). 
5 Earle and Sabirianova (2002) investigate wage arrears with a matched employer-employee data set. 
However, the number of observed workers per firm in their study is small and only permits a crude 
estimate of the relative importance of intra-firm versus inter-firm determinants of wage arrears. They 
do not provide any evidence on the distribution of wage arrears across all workers within Russian 
firms, something that we are able to do, at least for the one Russian firm for which we have personnel 
data. 
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firm attachment of accountants, which is demonstrated through their higher turnover 
rates than those of other employee groups. These higher turnover rates might have 
been a reflection of better outside options in the local labor market than for other 
employees.  
 The findings on real wage changes also contribute to the literature on wage 
rigidity. So far, this literature has documented compelling evidence that managers 
intentionally refrain from cutting nominal wages (Bewley, 1999). The resulting 
nominal rigidity is borne out in personnel data (e.g., Baker et al., 1994; Wilson, 1996 
and 1999; Altonji and Devereux, 2000; Dohmen, 2004). Clearly, nominal rigidity 
brings about real rigidity when there is zero inflation. In fact, Fehr and Goette (2005) 
provide evidence from personnel records showing that nominal rigidity even persists 
in a low growth environment with very low inflation, where it limits a firm’s 
discretion to adjust real wages downwards. This indicates that motives for not cutting 
wages are strong and important. However, it is less clear that real rigidity would also 
stem from strong intentions for preserving real wages.6 Our evidence suggests that 
such intentions are weak: although the firm is reluctant to cut nominal wages, it does 
not refrain from substantially cutting real wages, taking advantage of a high-
inflationary environment. We also complement the existing literature on real wage 
rigidity since we can – knowing the exact time period in which the 1998 financial 
crisis in Russia manifests – establish a direct link between the inflation shock and real 
wage adjustments at the firm.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides 
a brief account of the financial crisis and introduces the firm under study. Section 3 
                                                 
6 It is still controversial to what extent real wages are downward rigid. Card and Hyslop (1997) and 
Bauer et al. (2003) provide evidence for real wage rigidity using administrative micro data on wages 
.Baker et al. (1994) and Dohmen (2004) do not find that real wages are downward rigid in their 
analyses of personnel data.  
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describes the personnel data set. Section 4 presents the main results of our analysis 
and establishes some robust evidence about the evolution of wages and total 
compensation in the firm over the period that encompasses the financial crisis. A final 
section concludes. 
 
2. The Russian financial crisis and the firm  
 
In November 1997 and during 1998 the Russian economy was confronted with two 
speculative attacks on the ruble. While the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) was able to 
successfully defend the ruble in the first episode, in August 1998 financial meltdown 
occurred and on August 17, 1998 the Russian government devalued the ruble, 
defaulted on domestic debt, and declared a 90 days moratorium on payment to foreign 
creditors.  The classic ingredients of a financial crisis arising from a speculative attack 
on the currency were all present in the Russian case:7 (i) an exchange rate peg and the 
willingness of the CBR to defend it with foreign reserves; (ii) rising uncontrollable 
fiscal deficits with a prospect of their monetization; (iii) control of the interest rate by 
the CBR in a fragile credit market; and (iv) expectations of an impending devaluation 
of the ruble (see Appendix for further details).  
 When the ruble came under speculative attack in 1998, with hindsight the 
most sensible political response probably would have been to let the ruble float. The 
Russian government and the CBR were, however, adamant not to go down this route. 
Since 1995 Russia had pursued a stabilization policy that was in particular based on 
the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. This strong anti-inflationary stance had 
brought inflation down to 11 percent, but at a high cost as the real exchange rate 
appreciated considerably, putting tremendous pressure on the import-competing 
                                                 
7 For lucid discussions of the Russian financial meltdown, see Chiodo and Owyang (2002) and Kharas 
et al. (2001) and Summer’s and Williamson’s (2001) comments on the latter paper. 
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manufacturing sector. A floating ruble in 1998 was considered by the Russian 
authorities as out of the question, since it might have reignited inflation and would 
have completely undone the effects of the anti-inflationary policies that had caused so 
much pain. Given this political position, the CBR defended the ruble until foreign 
reserves were exhausted. 
 The financial crisis had severe short-term consequences, leading to an upsurge 
of inflation, a collapse of a large part of the private banking sector and a virtual stop 
of economic activities for some weeks. After this period, however, rising oil prices, a 
real depreciation of the ruble and a large fall in real wages set the Russian economy 
on a growth path, which is still ongoing. One main reason why the collapse of the 
banking had little effect on the real economy after the meltdown can be explained by 
the fact that private banks pre-crisis played mainly in the stock and bond markets and 
provided little lending capital to enterprises. In the run-up to and during the crisis, 
probably only few firms suffered because of decreased access to capital; however, 
firms did suffer because the overall lack of liquidity in the economy and a collapse in 
confidence of consumers and producers initiated a temporary standstill in economic 
activity and a reduction in demand for the products of firms.  
 The particular firm, for which we have data, is located in a provincial city in 
Russia and in the sector “machine building and metal works.” After having converted 
production lines from Soviet times “nearly one hundred percent”, according to the 
director general of the firm (CEO)8, it produces well equipment for gas and oil 
production and smith-press equipment. More than ninety percent of its production is 
destined for the Russian market. It has locally no competitors, but nationally it has to 
compete with more than 5 firms, among them importers from the European Union. 
                                                 
8 Source: Interview with the director general of the firm in the spring of 2002.  
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The firm was founded in the early fifties of the last century and privatized in 1992.  A 
decade later, in 2002, more than half of the shares were owned by managers and 
workers, about twenty percent by former employees and roughly a quarter by other 
Russian entities. While there is collective bargaining at this firm on paper, trade union 
representatives have virtually no influence on wage policy and wages are set 
unilaterally by top management.9 Real output, capacity utilization and profits were all 
at a trough in 1998, recovered slightly in 1999 and then took off dramatically after the 
year 2000.  
 How was the firm affected by the financial crisis? As we have seen, leading up 
to the crisis there was a sharp drop in oil prices. The ensuing drop in oil production 
affected the demand for its oil equipment negatively. In addition, even before the fall 
in oil prices the real appreciation of the ruble made it difficult for the firm to compete 
with importers. From the interview with the firm’s director general it is clear that the 
shortage of lending capital was less relevant for this firm than the drop in oil 
production and the high real exchange rate of the ruble. The devaluation of the ruble 
on August 17, 1998 brought a brief respite to the industry. This is also evident from 
Figure 1, which shows both the profitability of our firm and the profitability of the 
sector, in which the firm operates. According to the director general, the “[firm] 
became competitive in terms of price”. Dramatically falling real wages, not 
mentioned by the top manager, did certainly also their part, as we will see in what 
follows. By the spring of 2002 (the time of the interview), this advancement in 
competitiveness had evaporated, and EU firms had increased their market share in the 
market segment, in which the firm operates. Due to the high oil price demand for oil 
                                                 
9 In a second interview, which took place in April 2007, the CEO hinted at the fact that a large enough 
slice of shares belongs to top management enabling it to determine all policies of the firm unilaterally.  
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drilling equipment has, however, remained strong, which explains why profits and 
capacity utilization rates remained high at our firm even after 1999.    
 Figure 2 compares average real monthly wages paid by our firm during the 
period from 1997 to 2002 to real monthly wages in the local labor market, the sector 
our firm belongs to and to wages in the Russian economy. While wage trends in the 
sector, region (oblast) and nationwide economy are similar, our firm pays initially 
substantially higher wages. In the aftermath of the crisis we see a precipitous fall of 
the real wage in our firm, while real wages in the economy at large, the region and the 
sector show a more moderate fall. In the years following the crisis average real wages 
remain virtually unchanged in our firm but rise continuously for the three aggregates. 
By 2003 the average real wage in the economy and the sector exceed that in our firm. 
It is noteworthy, though, that the average regional wage remains below the firm’s 
average wage even in 2003.  
 
3. The personnel dataset  
We created an electronic file based on records from the personnel archive of the firm, 
and constructed a year-end panel data set for the years 1997 to 2002. We have records 
of all employees who were employed at any time during this period, except for top 
managers whose information is discarded for reasons of confidentiality. The data 
contain information on individuals’ demographic characteristics such as gender, age, 
marital status and number of children, on their educational attainment, retraining and 
other skill enhancement activities before joining the firm and during tenure at the 
firm. We also know the exact date when each employee started work at the firm as 
well as his/her complete working history before that date. We can trace each 
employee’s career within the firm since we have information on the current position 
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and on all previous positions and the periods when each of them was filled out by the 
employee. In addition we also know whether someone worked full-time or part-time. 
For those who separated from the firm we can distinguish between voluntary quit, 
transfer to another firm, individual dismissal, group dismissal and retirement.  
In Russian firms the workforce is often divided into five employee categories: 
administration (i.e. management) which we label “managers”; accounting and 
financial specialists whom we label “accountants”; engineering and technical 
specialists (including programmers) whom we subsume under the term “engineers”; 
primary and auxiliary production workers, whom we label “production workers”; and 
finally, service staff.10  
For the years 1997 to 2002 we have monthly wages averaged over the year, 
and information on the three types of bonuses paid to the workforce: (1) a monthly 
bonus amounting to a fixed percentage of the wage; (2) an extra annual bonus whose 
level depends on “the results of the year” (i.e. this bonus is a form of profit sharing); 
(3) an annual bonus labeled “other bonus”. While production workers never receive a 
monthly bonus, the bonus labeled “other bonus” is paid to production workers only. 
Wages are reported by the firm as the employee's average monthly wage in rubles for 
the year (or fraction of the year, if not employed for the full 12 months), with no 
adjustment for inflation.  The monthly bonus is reported as a percentage of the 
average monthly wage, and the corresponding ruble figure is recovered by applying 
the percentage to the nominal monthly wage.  The other two bonuses are reported in 
nominal rubles.  The inflation rate in Russia during this period was irregular and 
sometimes quite high - the price level more than doubled between the start of the 
financial crisis in July 1998 and April 1999, and was 0-2% per month before and after 
                                                 
10 Only production workers are subdivided into levels, primary production workers having eight and 
auxiliary production workers having six levels. 
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- and so some care is required to construct appropriate deflators.  Because nominal 
average monthly wage and the nominal monthly bonus are averages for the year, they 
are deflated into 1997 constant rubles using an annual average CPI, i.e., the average 
price level for the year relative to the average price level in 1997.  The other two 
bonuses are paid around the end of the year, and so these are converted into 1997 
constant rubles using the CPI price level for December of the corresponding year, i.e., 
the December price level in that year relative to the average 1997 price level.11  
 
4. Main Results  
 
Employment 
 
Table 1 shows that employment grew steadily from 3032 employees to 3221 
employees during the observation period from January 1997 until December 2002, 
with the exception of the post-crisis year 1999. Yet, the composition of the workforce 
hardly changed throughout the period. There is a small increase in the share of 
workers compensated by negligible falls in the shares of service staff, engineers and 
accountants, with managers retaining the same share of 3.8 percent throughout.  
                                                 
11 We have available monthly data on CPI inflation in Russia overall and in the oblast where the firm 
is located.  In this paper we work primarily with monthly wages averaged over the year, and so we 
compare average annual inflation rates in the oblast with national rates.  This comparison shows that 
inflation (in percent) in the oblast is very similar to national inflation:  
 
                 Russia     Oblast  
1997          15.4          14.0  
1998          38.1          38.7  
1999          98.6          97.9  
2000          20.8          20.4  
2001          21.6          19.1  
2002          16.0          14.5  
 
These indices are based on average monthly price levels calculated using monthly inflation rates. Over 
the entire period of 1997 to 2002, the cumulative price indices diverge by less than 3 percent. 
Consequently, results using wages and bonuses deflated by the national CPI are virtually identical to 
those using the oblast CPI.  We use the national CPI in what follows. 
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Turnover rates, calculated as the sum of hires and separations during a given 
year normalized by the stock at the beginning of the year, were particularly large in 
1997 and 1998 (see Table 2a). After the crisis they fell quite dramatically, in 2002 
reaching less than half the level of 1997. This secular pattern holds for all employee 
categories, but turnover was especially turbulent for accountants, production workers 
and service staff and much more modest for engineering staff throughout the period. 
In addition, while there was a large turnover of managers in the crisis year, there are 
few managers who enter or leave the firm after 1998. 
The fall in turnover rates after the crisis year of 1998 comes about because of 
a fall in separation and hiring rates (see Table 2a). The bulk of the separations (about 
80 percent) throughout the period are voluntary quits. Therefore the fall in the 
separation rate in the post-crisis year suggests that the financial crisis restrained many 
employees from quitting. The firm’s employees seem to have been continuously 
confronted with a more limited array of outside options compared with the situation 
before the crisis.12  
Additional evidence that lends support for the conjecture that workers’ outside 
options worsened during the crisis comes from turnover statistics in a sample of 37 
industrial firms located in the same city as our firm.13 Table 2b reveals that the 
turnover patterns in this regional sample are similar to those for the firm in the years 
1998 to 2001. In particular, separation rates fall by similar percentages for all 
employee categories, while the fall in inflows is more pronounced for our firm than 
for the regional sample. If we take the turnover rate as an indicator of local labor 
                                                 
12 Many workers in our firm saw these outside opportunities in the “suitcase trade”, travelling between 
Russia and, e.g., China or Turkey and buying and selling certain types of goods informally. Such 
opportunities were severely reduced after the crisis, resulting in a dramatic fall of the number of 
“suitcase traders” throughout Russia (Eder, Yakovlev and Çarkoglu, 2003).  
13 We have a balanced panel of 37 firms that represent roughly 15 percent of industrial employment in 
this city only for these four years.  The data of our firm are included in this panel as we want to 
estimate local labor marker turnover rates. 
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market conditions, we can infer that outside opportunities have diminished in a 
substantial fashion for all employee types compared to the period before the crisis. 
These diminished opportunities can also be seen by the movements of the 
unemployment rate in the given oblast. Being substantially lower in the pre-crisis 
years 1995-1997 than the average rate in the Russian Federation, it shot up by roughly 
five percentage points between 1998 and 1999, and then showed a cumulative fall of 
one percentage point in the years 2000 and 2001. While the local unemployment rate 
was roughly six percentage points lower than the Russian average in 1998, it was two 
percentage points higher in 2001. The described trends and relative magnitudes of the 
unemployment rate as well as the presented turnover patterns estimated from a 
regional sample of industrial firms demonstrate that local labor market conditions 
were decisively worse after the crisis year of 1998 and did not recover as rapidly as in 
the Russian Federation in general.14
 In order to see what drives separation rates, we estimate Cox proportional 
hazard models in which we specify calendar time as the duration variable (cf. 
Dohmen and Pfann, 2004) and assume the same baseline hazard for all five employee 
specific categories.15 The results are shown in Table 3. Specifications (1), (3) and (5) 
differ from (2), (4) and (6) only insofar as the second set of specifications controls for 
the position in the employee category specific wage distribution. The baseline hazard 
for specification (1), plotted in figure 3, shows a clear downward trend over the entire 
period, and is roughly twice as large before and during the crisis as in the years 2000-
                                                 
14 The sample of firms is not representative in terms of development of total employment in the region, 
since we have a balanced panel. However, the estimated inflow and outflow rates are indicative of 
falling outside opportunities after the crisis. 
15 An extension of these models allows for employee category specific baseline hazards. The estimates 
of such models, available on request, are virtually identical to the estimates of the presented models in 
the time invariant part of the Cox model. Also the estimated secular patterns of the various baseline 
hazards in the extended model are very similar to each other. We, therefore, stick to our simple 
specifications of the Cox model.    
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2002.  Separation rates are typically highest in December in each year (which is 
reflected by peaks in the baseline hazard), except for the crisis year when the hazard 
rate shoots up in the two months immediately following the crisis. In order to assess 
whether the determinants of the hazard rate differ during years of high turnover 
(1997-1999) and the period of low turnover (2000-2002), we also estimate the Cox 
proportional hazard models separately for the two sub-periods. 
 Tenure plays a minor role as far as separations from the firm are concerned. 
Employees with tenure up to two years and those who have been with the firm 
between 25 and 30 years have substantially lower hazard rates than workers in the 
reference category who are in their 10th year of employment at the firm; otherwise the 
tenure hazard profiles are rather flat. It is also noteworthy that the highlighted tenure 
effects are only significant in the first sub-period. In this period of high turnover 
educational attainment only weakly affects the separation hazard, while between 2000 
and 2002 employees with more than basic education have a higher propensity to leave 
the firm than those employees with lowest educational attainment, indicating that 
external labor market options play a role in separation decisions. The very young and 
those who have reached retirement age have a much higher separation rate than those 
employees who are between 30 and 35 years of age. The age hazard profiles are also 
striking insofar as workers over the age of 45, but still far from retirement, have a 
substantially lower propensity to separate from the firm than other age groups. Female 
employees have higher separation rates than their male counterparts, especially in the 
period of high labor turnover. On the other hand, employees with children are more 
reluctant to leave the firm. 
 In both periods, service staff and engineers remain more with the firm than 
production workers and accountants; while in the years 2000 to 2002 there is only one 
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manager who exits. When turnover is high, hazard rates are highest for those 
employees located in the polar deciles, while in the second period only persons in the 
lowest decile have a higher propensity to leave. In addition, ceteris paribus, 
employees in the seventh and eight deciles seem to be more reluctant to leave the 
firm.   
 The years leading up to the crisis, 1997 and 1998, saw the largest turnover by 
far in the firm. As a robustness check, we, therefore, repeat our hazard rates 
estimations for these two years. The results, which are not shown here but available 
on request, are in line with the results of the first period shown in columns (3) and (4) 
of table 4 as far as the signs of the coefficients are concerned and strengthened since 
some previously insignificant covariates gain predictive power. In particular, the 
result that workers from the polar deciles of the employee category specific wage 
distribution have the highest hazard rates in the period 1997 to 1999 comes through 
even stronger since the proportional hazards are 13 percentage points larger for the 
lowest decile and 8 percentage points larger for the highest decile in the regression 
that is limited to the years 1997 and 1998. In summary, while most of the action took 
place in these two years, the presented results that cover the period 1997 to 1999 seem 
to reflect well the factors driving separations in our firm before and in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis.   
      
Wage structure 
 
Figure 4 plots kernel density estimates of the real wage distributions for different 
employee categories in 1997. It is immediately obvious that there is substantial 
heterogeneity in wages within employee categories. Moreover, real wage distributions 
for different employee categories overlap, so that many high paid production workers, 
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for example, earned at least as much as lower paid managers. Service staff had the 
lowest mean wages in 1997 followed, somewhat surprisingly, by engineers, then 
production workers and accountants. Managers had the highest wages on average. 
This ranking of employee group-specific wage distributions remains unchanged 
throughout the observation period.  
Estimates from OLS regressions of log wages in 1997, reported in Table 4, 
show that service staff earn on average 52 percent less than production workers, while 
the latter earn around 6 percent more than engineering staff. Accountants and 
managers earn approximately 50 and 95 percent more than production workers (see 
column (1)). The estimated coefficients from the augmented Mincer wage regression 
in column (1) also illustrate that workers with longer tenure and more education 
receive higher wages. Women earn significantly less than men, while marital status 
and the number of children do not have a significant impact on wages. The mentioned 
factors significantly determine the wage structure throughout the observation period, 
but the size of the effects is attenuated over time. For example, while employees with 
university degree earned about 13 percent higher wages than employees with only 
basic education (conditional on employee category) in 1997, their wage mark-up falls 
to only 11 percent in 2002 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). It is also striking that 
wage tenure profiles are much flatter in 2002 than in 1997. In addition, the gender 
wage gap is reduced between 1997 and 2002 from 27 to 15 percent, and, with the 
exception of managers, wage differences between employee categories have 
diminished as well by 2002, an issue to which we return later. Columns (2) to (6) 
show wage regressions for the different employee categories.  
Quantile regressions (reported in Table A2 in the Appendix) show that the 
effect of tenure on wages is similar across the entire wage distribution in 1997. As far 
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as the impact of educational attainment is concerned, we see two results. Employees 
with higher education (university graduates) have a positive relative return throughout 
the distribution, while for the other educational groups the highest premia are in the 
lowest deciles. The gender wage gap is substantially larger in the lower half of the 
distribution and especially attenuated in the 9-th decile. Relative to production 
workers service staff encounters a growing “wage penalty” as one goes from lower to 
higher deciles. It is noteworthy that engineers earn the same as production workers if 
they find themselves in the lower tail of the distribution but earn less from the third 
decile onwards. For accountants the “mark-up” over production workers falls from 90 
percent in the 1st decile to 20 percent in the 8th decile, while for managers the mark-up 
falls from 185 percent in the 1st decile to 59 percent in the 9th decile. The results of 
quantile regressions for 200216, though qualitatively in line with the results for 1997, 
show attenuated differences in the impact of the above discussed covariates on log 
wages across the wage distribution. This is not surprising given the strong 
compression of the wage distribution during the studied period.  
Real total compensation at our firm developed similarly, since the share of 
wages, unsurprisingly, made up the lion share of total income in all years as Table 4 
shows.17 In the crisis year of 1998, the wage share rose to more than 90 percent of 
total income and then declined to slightly more than three quarters of total income in 
2002. The shares of all bonus components fell in the crisis year but then more than 
recovered in the remaining years.  
 
                                                 
16 These results are not shown here but are available on request from the authors. 
17 The estimates of the quantile regressions on log total real compensation are also very similar to the 
results for the quantile wage regressions. Several difference are, however, worth commenting on: 
When bonus payments are added to wages, engineering staff and production workers have nearly the 
same mark-ups over service staff in 1997. This convergence is, however, reversed in the year 2002. 
The mark-ups of managers, on the other hand, are larger in both polar data points when total 
compensation is estimated. 
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Nominal and real rigidity 
 
An inspection of the data reveals that the firm never cuts nominal wages.18 Real 
wages, however, fall markedly in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 1998. Figure 
5 and Figure 6 show that real wages and real monthly compensation (measured as the 
sum of real monthly wages and the monthly share of all real bonus payments for the 
year) in the upper half of the respective distribution fell most, both in absolute and in 
relative terms, and recovered least in post crisis years. As a result, kernel density 
estimates of the wage distributions in 2002, which are plotted in Figure 7, are clearly 
to the left of the real wage distributions in 1997, for all employee categories. The real 
wage distributions also seem more compressed.19
 
 
Who bears the burden of the shock? Individual wage mobility 
 
Even though average real wages fall, not all employees are affected by the crisis in the 
same way. This becomes evident from Figure 8 which plots the kernel density 
estimate of the distribution function of real wage growth between 1997 and 2002. 
These heterogeneous real wage growth rates cause substantial relative wage mobility 
inside the firm as transition rates between quintiles of the wage distribution in 1997 
(the origin state) and in 2002 (the destination state), calculated for the balanced panel 
of those who were continuously employed during the entire period, in Table 5 
                                                 
18 Sources close to the firm’s top management told us that the firm never contemplated to cut nominal 
wages since such cuts might have resulted in even higher quit rates than the ones observed before the 
crisis. 
19 Since we are interested in the wage policies of our firm, ideally we would like to deflate nominal 
wages by a product-specific deflator, which we alas do not have. We do not use the national PPI 
instead of the CPI for two reasons: first, one of the foci of the paper is the welfare of the firm’s 
employees, for whom real consumption wages are the relevant unit; second, the national PPI is based 
on a basket of many industrial products, whose price movements might or might not track the price 
movements of the products of our firm. 
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reveal.20 For example, only 35 percent of all employees who found themselves in the 
third quintile of the wage distribution in 1997 remain there in 2002, while 41 percent 
move up in the wage distribution and 24 percent move down. This pattern is observed 
for all employment groups, but is particularly marked for production workers.21 The 
transition patterns are also very similar albeit slightly stronger for total compensation. 
Thus, the firm substantially realigned real wages and total compensation during the 
inflationary period following the financial crisis, especially for the core group of the 
firm, the production workers.  
In order to assess whether particular characteristics systematically determine 
relative wage growth, we regress the growth rate of real wages between 1997 and 
2002 on various individual characteristics and job characteristics. We restrict the 
sample to full-time employees who were continuously employed during the entire 
observation period.  
Table 7 contains the regression results with three different specifications of the 
wage growth equation. Specification (1) estimates wage growth as a function of a 
cubic in tenure and age, dummies for highest educational attainment, and 
demographic dummies. This specification assumes that wage growth does not depend 
on an individual’s position in the firm-level wage distribution in 1997. The tenure-
wage growth profile looks as follows: tenure and wage growth are inversely related 
up to approximately 20 years, between 21 and 30 years of tenure wage growth 
remains flat at roughly minus 22 percent and then turns slightly more negative for 
longer-tenured employees. On this measure, the firm seemed to favor those 
employees who have been hired more recently. Holding other factors constant, female 
                                                 
20Some scholars studying Russian labor markets in the first half of the 1990’s maintained that there was 
substantial relative wage mobility in the economy at large (see, e.g. Commander et al., 1995). 
21 Transition matrices showing wage and compensation dynamics for different employee categories are 
available from the authors on request. 
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employees earn a substantial premium if the results of the model in column 1 are to be 
believed.  
Specification (2) adds dummies for the employee’s position in the firm-level 
wage distribution in 1997. This model might still be too simplistic, since it assumes 
that all employees were confronted with the same wage distribution in 1997. As we 
have seen, though, the locations and the spreads of the wage distributions for the 5 
employee categories were very different in 1997. To take account of this, 
specification (3) adds controls for the location in the employee category-specific wage 
distribution and dummies for employee categories. The results of specifications (2) 
and (3) are similar, and we concentrate our discussion on the results of specification 
(3).  
The impact of tenure, while somewhat attenuated, remains negative 
throughout the tenure distribution. Secondary professional and higher educational 
attainment imply higher wage growth, while female employees experience smaller 
wage growth than their male counterparts. The latter result, reversing the estimated 
wage growth premium for female employees in specification (1), can be explained by 
the fact that women find themselves in 1997 in employee and wage segments that 
exhibit the highest growth throughout the reported period.  
The coefficients on the decile dummies strongly confirm our contention that 
employees positioned in 1997 in the lower deciles of their respective wage 
distribution experienced relative gains in the reported period. Location in the lower 
four deciles implies stronger wage growth than for those employees who were 
positioned in 1997 in the median decile. These relative gains are monotonically 
decreasing as we go from the bottom to the 4th decile. In contrast, employees 
positioned in 1997 in the highest four deciles of their wage distribution are confronted 
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with relative wage losses. Relative to production workers, service staff and engineers 
have wage gains over the period, while accountants and managers have wage losses 
albeit of a small order. 
In Table 8 we relax the assumption that wage growth is equiproportionate for 
each quantile across all employee categories, and estimate wage growth regressions 
for each employee category separately.  The results show clear differences in the 
returns to the various deciles for the five employee categories. In particular, the 
relative returns for service staff show a much larger spread across the wage 
distribution than for other employee categories. In addition, production workers 
experience positive wage growth higher up in the wage distribution than other 
employees. Overall the result is, however, very clear, no matter what the employee 
category: employees who find themselves in 1997 in the lower part of their respective 
wage distribution experience substantially higher wage growth than those who are 
located in the upper part.22  
We use the sub-sample of those remaining in the firm between 1997 and 2002 
in our wage growth regressions, which might raise the issue of sample selection bias. 
If unobserved factors that influence workers’ decisions to remain in the firm are 
correlated with unobserved determinants of wage growth, our results would be biased. 
Furthermore, since, in the years 1997 to 1999, workers from the lowest and highest 
wage deciles leave the firm more frequently than other workers, the observed 
compression of real wages might be caused predominantly by workers selecting 
themselves out of the firm. In order to check the robustness of our wage growth 
results and to see that our story of relative wage gains in the lower part of the 
distribution is not mainly driven by selection, we proceed in two ways. We estimate 
                                                 
22 The estimated effect of all of these determinants on  the growth of total compensation are very 
similar, which is not surprising, given that the different bonus payments only account for a small share 
of total compensation. 
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annual wage growth models, where selection should be less of a problem, and we 
estimate wage growth between 1997 and 2002 using Heckit (Tobit II) models that try 
to correct explicitly for self-selection.   
The results of the annual real wage growth regressions, which are not 
presented here23, are very much in line with the results of table 7. The covariates that 
have an impact on wage growth between 1997 and 2002 also influence annual wage 
growth. What is especially encouraging is the fact that workers who found themselves 
in the lower deciles of the origin wage distributions have disproportional wage growth 
also in the annual regressions, even if this effect is somewhat attenuated. 
The estimates of the Heckit models are presented in table A3 in the annex. The 
three specifications of table 7 are replicated with self-selection explicitly modeled. 
The selection equations use the same covariates as the Cox proportional hazard 
models.24 A comparison of the factors determining wage growth in table 7 and in the 
Heckit regressions finds the same signs and virtually always the same level of 
significance for the coefficient estimates. The coefficients on the deciles of both the 
firm-level wage distribution and the employee category specific wage distribution 
show hardly any differences between the estimates of table 7 and the Heckit 
estimates. So, our main result still holds: controlling for other factors and controlling 
for selection, employees in the lower (upper) part of the wage distribution experience 
relative gains (losses) over the reported period. It is, finally, also noteworthy that the 
selection term is insignificant in the third specification, i.e., once we condition on 
location in the employee category specific wage distribution, unobserved factors 
determining wage growth are not any longer correlated with unobserved factors 
affecting “participation.” 
                                                 
23 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
24 This is done for consistency but also to easily identify the models. 
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 Extraction of rents and approaching the outside option 
As we have seen, local labor market opportunities seem to have fallen substantially 
after the crisis year of 1998. These falling outside opportunities made it possible for 
the top management of the firm to use inflation to erode the rents that the firm’s 
employees enjoyed before the crisis. Table 9 shows that the large positive differences  
between mean wages in the firm and mean wages in the sample of industrial firms 
located in the same local labor market observed in the years 1997 to 1999 turned 
either negative towards the end of the period or were tremendously reduced. The 
convergence of average wages in the firm towards average wages in the local labor 
market started after 1999 when employees’ rents peaked. The extraction of rents 
during the period of real wage adjustment was quite relentless as a comparison of the 
entries for 1999 and the entries for 2002 reveals. If we link these relative wage 
movements to the information that we provided about local labor market conditions, it 
seems plausible that the top management of the firm uses these local labor market 
conditions as an important element in its calculus regarding wage setting. This 
conjecture is confirmed by the CEO when asked directly about the determination of 
wage levels. According to him, three dimensions are relevant for wage determination: 
the characteristics of a worker, i.e., her/his qualification, tenure, seniority and work 
experience in general; labor market conditions, in particular the wage level in the 
region and the wage level in the sector; and the price of the order in whose production 
the employee is engaged.  
In sum, given our evidence on the time patterns of regional turnover, the 
regional unemployment rate, declining relative wage gaps and the statement by the 
CEO of the firm, we are confident that local labor market conditions are of paramount 
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importance in the calculus of top management when it comes to wage setting. It is 
also our conjecture that in this Russian firm the causal effect runs from turnover to 
wages and not vice versa. This might seem counterintuitive as one would surmise that 
high wages would cause a fall in turnover. However, the efficiency wage models that 
explained the causal effect going from wages to turnover (see, e.g., Salop, 1979) are 
embedded in a mature capitalist economy that finds itself in a steady state. The 
Russian economy in the 1990s was clearly not in a steady state but in great turmoil 
with a tremendous amount of labor reallocation taking place. The CEO of our firm 
paints the following picture of this dramatic period when explaining the development 
of wages in the firm: “Higher than regional wages contributed to retaining and 
attracting highly qualified personnel after difficult crisis years in the beginning of the 
1990s, when episodes of forced downsizing due to the output decline took place. 
Later, in 1995-1996, the firm started to receive orders, production growth began, and 
there was a need for qualified personnel. Since economic improvement happened all 
over the country, the only way to retain and attract personnel was to pay high wages. 
After the 1998 crisis, it was economically expedient to stabilize wages at the regional 
level.”25 In the final analysis market forces work in the case of our Russian firm and 
that in a relentless fashion.  
  
Wage Arrears 
Withholding wages on a regular basis has been the experience of many Russian 
workers during most of the nineties (see, e.g., Lehmann, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 
1999, and Earle and Sabirianova, 2002), and is therefore an important component of a 
firm’s wage policy. The personnel data of the firm records the stock of wage arrears 
                                                 
25 Cited from the interview of April 2007. 
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for each employee on the 31st of December of the respective year. According to this 
data, wage arrears were recorded only at the end of 1998. However, we do have 
information about the monthly stocks of wage arrears by employee type taken from 
the CERT regional firm panel data. According to this data source, employees at the 
firm at hand were confronted with wage arrears in the years 1998 and 1999. Figure 9, 
which is based on the CERT data, shows that wage arrears start to accumulate in 
January 1998 and peak after roughly one year and then decline continuously until they 
dissipate at the end of 1999. This suggests that wage arrears were used by the firm to 
cushion the shock arising from the build-up to the financial crisis, its actual 
occurrence and its aftermath.  
Real wage arrears as a fraction of monthly wages were lowest on average 
among production workers. Accountants were most adversely affected by arrears. 
Managers were not spared and also had part of their wages withheld. Compared to the 
general situation in Russia in 1998, the non-payment of wages in our firm was, 
however, not dramatic. Goskomstat reports total wage arrears in 1998 in Russia, 
which amount to roughly two monthly wages, while all average wage arrears in the 
firm never amounted to more than one tenth of a month of 1997 wages. Even the 
average accumulated wage arrears for the worst affected group, accountants, never 
exceeded a third of a month of 1997 wages.26  
Since wage arrears in the firm only started in 1998 and since they had 
disappeared by the end of 1999, we only have one cross section (the year 1998) of the 
stock of arrears of all employees. To the extent that the information derived from the 
CERT regional firm panel data that accumulated wage arrears peaked in December 
1998 is valid, the wage arrears data based on the personnel data capture that moment 
                                                 
26 This is consistent with our interpretation of the crisis as primarily a short-time liquidity crisis for the 
firm, followed by a medium-term improvement in economic performance driven by the devaluation of 
the ruble and the consequent improved competitiveness of the firm. 
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when presumably their incidence, their level and their variation was largest across the 
population.  
The personnel data show that roughly 60 percent of all employees had no 
arrears at all at the end of 1998 and only 10 percent experienced arrears worth one 
week of monthly pay or more. The summary statistics of Table 10 show how limited 
wage arrears are for the entire workforce and give some details of how these limited 
arrears are distributed across the five types of employees. Arrears are shown in 
thousands of 1997 rubles (A) and as a fraction of 1997 monthly wages (B). The panel 
for all employees shows very small mean values and a relatively small spread no 
matter how arrears are measured. Even at the 90 percentile arrears never amount to 
more than a third of monthly wages and the maximum value is given by slightly more 
than one month of wages. What is clear from the table is that production workers had 
been treated favorably by the firm in 1998, since even at the 75 percentile we do not 
observe any arrears. The other employee categories have a more even incidence since 
we find positive wage arrears already at the 25 percentile (not shown in the table).  
However, the worst treatment seems to have been reserved for accountants, who have 
the highest levels of wage arrears throughout the distribution.  
 How are wage arrears correlated with real wages? To answer this question we 
perform simple Tobit regressions, where those observations with zero wage arrears 
are left-censored and where real arrears and arrears in terms of wages are regressed on 
real wages. An extended model includes dummies for the employee types. The 
bivariate model implies that employees with higher wages have lower levels of wage 
arrears (column (2) of Table 11); however, once we include controls for employee 
type there is a positive correlation between real wages and real wage arrears (column 
3). Larger wages, on the other hand, imply smaller wage arrears in terms of monthly 
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wages whether we control for employee type or not (columns (4) and (5)). The 
coefficients on the dummies in columns 3 and 5 also confirm that, controlling for 
wages, production workers were best treated while accountants had a particularly bad 
experience regarding wage arrears. 
 To see whether the incidence of wage arrears varies across certain 
characteristics of employees we also perform simple probit regressions for the entire 
sample and for the different employee categories separately. The results, which are 
not shown here,27 show some robust partial correlations. Most noteworthy is the result 
that employees with longer tenure were less affected by wage arrears than those with 
average tenure. This result is particularly strong for engineering staff and production 
workers and seems to indicate that, at least in this firm long-tenured employees were 
given preferential treatment and thus highly valued. This outcome is in sharp contrast 
to studies that base their evidence on nation-wide surveys and that suggest that long 
tenure in the nineties in Russia was associated with a larger incidence of wage arrears 
resulting from poor labor market prospects for long-serving employees (Lehmann et 
al., 1999, and Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). It is, therefore, feasible that in our firm 
(where mass layoffs finished in 1993) long tenure implies having acquired a large 
stock of firm-specific human capital that is valuable to the firm even under the 
circumstances of a demand driven economy. A further robust result is the inverse 
relationship between educational attainment and the incidence of wage arrears, 
pointing to a better treatment of more educated employees. Female and male 
employees are equally treated as far as wage arrears are concerned if we look at the 
entire sample. This result is driven by the fact that male production workers 
experience smaller arrears than their female counterparts while among the engineering 
                                                 
27 They are available on request from the authors. 
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staff – the second largest group after production workers – females are less affected. 
The simple probit regressions make clear in any case that, within this firm, employees 
were not equally treated when it came to withholding wages and that top management 
tried to keep content those employees that it valued most.  
 
Inequality 
 
A comparison of Figures 4 and 7 reveals that real wage distributions become more 
compressed. The difference in the median wage and wages for an employee at the 90th 
percentile of the distribution is reduced by slightly less than 15 percentage points 
during the period from 1997 to 2002. The gap between the wage of an employee at 
the 10th percentile of the wage distribution and the median wage narrowed by 37 
percentage points from 1997 to 2002. Hence, the fall in wage inequality comes about 
by relative wage gains of employees in the lower part of the wage distribution. Gini 
coefficients reported in column (1) of Table 12 corroborate the decline in inequality 
of wages and total compensation for the entire workforce. The Gini coefficients in 
columns (2) – (6) show that wage and compensation inequality falls also within all 
employee categories in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, this process of 
wage and compensation compression is not monotonic for all employee categories. 
For example, inequality fell to very low levels for service staff and managers in 2001, 
but rises again thereafter.  
The Gini coefficient can be written as G= (2/µ) cov(y,F(y)), where y is 
income, F(y) is the distribution function of y and µ is mean income (see, e.g., 
Lambert, 2001). A simple algebraic manipulation then arrives at the decomposition of 
G into its components by income source:  
∑=
k
kkk SGRG    (1), 
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where Rk is the rank correlation of income source k with the distribution of total 
income, Gk is the Gini of income source k and Sk is the share of component k in total 
income.28 The decomposition of the Gini coefficient by income source is particularly 
interesting in our context to establish the contribution of the various components to 
inequality. The k-th component of equation (1) divided by G, i.e., 
G
SGR kkk , gives us 
the share of income source k in total inequality. Dividing this expression by Sk shows 
the inequality component as a fraction of its income share. Finally, k
kkk S
G
SGR −  
approximates the impact of a 1 percent change of income source k on overall 
inequality. This latter measure can also be understood as income source k’s marginal 
effect relative to the overall Gini (see Lerman and Yitzaki, 1985). 
The upper panel of Table 13 presents the Gini coefficients for the different 
compensation components. Inequality in wages and in the extra bonus gradually falls 
with the exception that inequality in the extra bonus was zero in the crisis year 1998 
since no extra bonus was paid at all. The other two bonus types show a more erratic 
behavior. The compression in total compensation is less pronounced than the 
compression in wages, not least because the Gini coefficients of bonuses were far 
higher than the Gini coefficients of wages (see top panel of Table 13). Despite this 
large difference between the Gini coefficients of bonus payments and the Gini 
coefficient of wages, bonuses contributed little to overall inequality for two reasons. 
First, their shares were small relative to the share of wages (see Table 5). Second, the 
rank correlations of all bonus payments with the distribution of total income were far 
weaker than the nearly perfect rank correlation of wages (see bottom panel of 
                                                 
28 This decomposition is due to Lerman and Yitzaki (1985) who show that 
 . ]/][/),cov(2)][,cov(/),[cov(),cov()/2(
11
µµµµ kkkkkk
K
k
k
K
k
k FyFyFyFyG ∑∑
==
==
 29
Table 13).29 Wages contributed slightly less to overall inequality than their share in 
total income, as Table 14 demonstrates, and therefore have had an (hypothetical) 
attenuating impact on overall inequality in all years as the bottom panel of Table 14 
reveals. Monthly bonus payments, in contrast, “aggravated” overall inequality in all 
years apart from 1999.  
Alternative measures of inequality like general entropy indices confirm the 
findings concerning the compression of wages and total compensation. The general 
entropy index, which is given by  
∑ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= i
ix
N
GEI 1)(
)1(
1)( αµααα                       (2), 
where N is the number of observational units, xi is the level of earnings of the i-th 
observational unit, and µ is mean earnings, allows us to assess whether the change in 
inequality is mostly driven by changes at the bottom or by changes at the top of the 
distribution, by varying the parameter α. The index is more sensitive to changes at the 
top of the distribution the larger is α.30 Since the fall in the general entropy index for a 
parameter value of -1 is more pronounced than for a value of 1, we conclude that the 
relative gains at the bottom of the wage and the compensation distributions are the 
more important driving factors of the fall in overall inequality. If we give more weight 
to wages in the lower part of the distribution, our measure of overall wage inequality, 
GEI(-1) indicates that inequality fell by 62 percent between 1997 and 2002. If, on the 
other hand, the index is more sensitive to wages in the upper part of the distribution 
                                                 
29 One might find it puzzling that the Gini of total compensation is very close to the Gini of wages 
given these far higher Gini coefficients for bonus payments. For example in 1997 the Gini of total 
compensation amounts to 0.2928 while the Gini of wages is 0.2802. A simple back of the envelope 
calculation, using equation (1), brings home the point that the large Gk ’s of the bonus components are 
“wiped out” by their small Sk’s and Rk’s.     
30 GEI(α) encompasses several well known inequality measures: for example, GEI(0) corresponds to 
the mean log deviation, GEI(1) to the Theil index and GEI(2) to one half of the square of the 
coefficient of variation. We use a modified version of the Stata module “descogini” by Alejandro 
Lopez-Feldman for our calculations. See Feldman (2005). 
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then measured overall wage inequality fell by “only” 44 percent (see columns (1) and 
(4) of panel a of Table 15). Falling inequality is mostly driven by compression within 
the lower part of the wage distribution in all employee categories except for 
managers.31  
The general entropy index can also be additively decomposed into the within 
and between parts of inequality. This decomposition reveals that inequality within 
employee categories dominate overall wage inequality in 1997, while in 2002 within 
and between group inequality are of roughly equal magnitude (see columns (2) and 
(3) as well as columns (5) and (6) of top panel of Table 15). The GEI(-1) and GEI(1) 
measures indicate that within-inequality fell, respectively, by 69 and 60 percent and 
that between-inequality was reduced by 37 and 1 percent respectively. Most of the 
compression in the overall wage distribution between 1997 and 2002 occurred 
because there was tremendous compression of wages within employee categories. 
These patterns also hold for inequality of total compensation as the statistics in the 
bottom panel of Table 15 demonstrate. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Having a rich personnel data set of one Russian firm for the years 1997 to 2002 at our 
disposal, we can trace out the evolution of wages, total compensation and 
employment in a period that included the financial crisis of 1998. The observed 
evolution points to “price” rather than “quantity” adjustment within the firm during 
the crisis as employment remained stable but real wages and real compensation fell 
                                                 
31 For example, wage inequality for service staff and production workers fell by 70 percent and 58 
percent if we take GEI(-1), but only by 60 percent and 41 percent respectively if we use GEI(1) to 
calculate percentage changes in inequality. For managers, on the other hand, these percentage changes 
amount to 64 and 68 percent. Detailed results are available from the authors upon request. 
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substantially. Our evidence thus shows that the firm does not refrain from 
substantially cutting real wages, taking advantage of a high-inflationary environment.   
The downward adjustment of earnings leads to persistent welfare losses 
among employees since real wages and real compensation levels had not recovered to 
pre-crisis levels by 2002, even though the firm’s financial situation was then better 
than before the crisis. The firm, which was a high-wage firm prior to 1998, makes use 
of the high inflation that manifests during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in order to extract rents from employees. These welfare losses were, however, not 
spread evenly across all employees, since the firm curbs earnings most for those who 
earned the highest rents, which results in a tremendous compression of real wages. 
Wage growth regressions spanning the years 1997 to 2002 show disproportionate 
wage growth for those employees located in the lowest four deciles of the wage 
distribution in 1997 while employees positioned in the highest four deciles are 
confronted with relative wage losses. Relative to production workers, service staff and 
engineers have wage gains over the period, while accountants and managers have 
small wage losses.  
The firm was in a position to extract rents from its employees because of a fall 
in outside opportunities in the local labor market as evidenced by dramatically falling 
separation rates after 1999. At the bottom end of the firm’s wage distribution there 
are, however, few rents before the crisis and the firm seems to pay a wage close to the 
opportunity cost for employees at that end of the distribution throughout the reported 
period.    
Wage arrears occur in this firm in 1998 and 1999, but they are a minor issue as 
the average level of arrears never amounted to more than one tenth of a month of 
1997 monthly wages. Our findings also indicate that production workers as well as 
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employees with long tenure face fewer wage arrears. The worst affected group are 
accountants who seem further penalized by lower nominal wage growth than other 
employee categories. It is possible that this treatment by the firm was a reaction to a 
rather loose firm attachment of accountants which is demonstrated through their 
higher turnover rates than those of other employee groups.  
Our analysis thus shows that the costs of the crisis are unevenly distributed 
across the firm’s workforce and that the firm tries to shelter those workers whom it 
values most from the fallout of the crisis. All in all, though, we take the differential 
treatment of employee groups within the firm as evidence that market forces strongly 
influence the wage policies of our firm. 
Since our firm is in manufacturing, the empirical analysis of wages and 
employment gives us insights that can possibly be generalized to workers in the 
tradable sector of any developing country undergoing a macroeconomic shock.32 
                                                 
32 Fallon and Lucas (2002) assess the impact of financial crises on labor markets and household income 
and record the different experiences of workers in the traded and non-traded sector during a financial 
crisis and its aftermath in their sample of developing countries. In these countries agriculture is the 
main traded sector, while in Russia manufacturing belongs to this sector. In an interview, the CEO of 
the analyzed Russian firm clearly states that the prospects of the firm are strongly determined by 
movements in the real exchange rate since the firm competes with importers from the EU in the 
Russian and other markets of the CIS.  
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Appendix: The causes of the financial crisis 
The crux of the problems leading to the financial meltdown were rising public deficits 
and rising public debt that could not be contained in the medium run. Underlying the 
dynamics of public debt were structural problems related to tax compliance and tax 
collection. In addition, the price of oil started its slide in December 1997 and 
continuously fell in the first half of 1998, leading to less output and less tax revenue. 
Much of the public deficits had been financed with short-term government securities 
(so-called GKO’s) since 1995. About a third of these GKO’s were held by foreigners 
and a large amount of thus foreign held short-term debt came due in 1998. The 
attempt to swap most of these short-term securities for longer-termed Eurobonds was 
only partially successful and given the essentially fixed exchange range the CBR 
could fight off the speculative attack on the ruble only through the depletion of 
foreign reserves. 
 The CBR tried to contain the currency crisis in the summer of 1998 also by 
slowing down the growth rate of the money supply and by twice raising the lending 
rate to banks from 30 to 150 percent. This rise in interest rates aggravated the 
country’s debt problem as interest payments increased substantially. Consequently 
pressure on the currency grew even more as investors were convinced that Russian 
authorities would devalue to finance non-denominated debt. Because of the fragile 
nature of the Russian financial markets, the dramatic jump of the interest rate did not 
increase the supply of capital to firms, but actually made it nearly impossible for firms 
to raise capital for new investment projects, leading to a further fall in output, which 
exacerbated the debt problem even more. Attempts by international organizations to 
inject some liquidity in the Russian economy at that stage turned out be too little and 
too late. 
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 Expectations of Russia’s impending devaluation and default were also a 
crucial factor in the build-up of the crisis. The financial meltdowns in Asia alerted 
many investors to a possible default in Russia as did public relations disasters 
perpetrated by Russian authorities. The latter convinced investors that Russian policy 
makers were divided on how to solve the ensuing debt crisis and were thus more and 
more convinced of eventual devaluation and default (for details see Chiodo and 
Owygang,2002). 
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Notes: The figure shows the percentage of profits relative to sales for the firm and the average 
percentage of profits to sales for the machine building and metal working sector.  
Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
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Notes: The figure shows average real monthly wages in thousands of 1997 rubles for the firm, the 
region in which the firm is located, the machine building and metal working sector and the entire 
Russian economy.  
Source: Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3 
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The figure plots the baseline hazard rate of a Cox proportional hazard model, where this baseline 
hazard rate is assumed to be uniform for the five employee categories, “service staff”, “engineers”, 
“workers”, “accountants” and “managers”, and where calendar time is specified as the duration 
variable. See text for further explanations. 
Source: Personnel records of the firm. 
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Notes: The figure plots the smoothed density functions of the real wage distributions in 1997 for the 
five employee categories in 1997 rubles, estimated using a Gaussian kernel. The bandwidth is chosen 
to minimize the mean integrated squared error under the assumption that data are Gaussian.  
Source: Personnel records of the firm, national CPI deflator from Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
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 Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 6 Distribution of total real compensation in rubles - all employees
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 Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
0
1
2
3
4
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 2 4 6
Real monthly wages in thousands of 1997 rubles
service staff workers
engineers accountants
managers
Real Wage Distributions in 2002
 
Notes: The figure plots the smoothed density functions of the real wage distributions in 2002 for the 
five employee categories in 1997 rubles, estimated using a Gaussian kernel. The bandwidth is chosen 
to minimize the mean integrated squared error under the assumption that the data are Gaussian.  
Source: Personnel records of the firm, national CPI deflator from Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
 
 43
 
 
Figure 8 
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Notes: The figure plots the smoothed density functions of the distribution of real wage growth between 
1997 and 2002 for the all employees who stayed with the firm during the entire period. Wages were 
deflated using the national CPI The density function is estimated using a Gaussian kernel. The 
bandwidth is chosen to minimize the mean integrated squared error under the assumption that the data 
are Gaussian.  
Source: Personnel records of the firm, CPI deflator from Rosstat, authors’ calculations. 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
  Table 1: Composition of Workforce (in %), 1997 to 2002 
        
Year 
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers Total 
Absolute 
number of 
employees
1997 7.1 24.8 62.1 2.2 3.8 100 3032 
1998 7.0 24.4 62.6 2.1 3.8 100 3081 
1999 6.9 24.6 62.6 2.1 3.8 100 3077 
2000 7.0 24.4 62.8 2.1 3.8 100 3110 
2001 6.9 24.0 63.2 2.0 3.8 100 3175 
2002 6.9 23.7 63.6 1.9 3.8 100 3221 
Notes: The table shows the composition of the workforce in terms of the five employee categories in 
percentages. The absolute number of employees is displayed in the rightmost column. 
Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations 
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Table 2b: Hiring and Separation and Turnover Rates (in %) in sample of industrial firms in the region - 1998-2001  
  Service staff   Engineers  
Production 
workers  Accountants  Managers   All Employment
Year                   
                 
In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total
1998 9.2 21.6 30.8 10.8 13.0 23.8 11.3 12.8 24.1 3.1 4.4 7.5 2.1 5.4 7.5 10.9 12.6 23.5 
1999                  
                   
                     
13.2 15.5 28.7 8.6 7.5 16.1 13.1 13.1 26.2 4.1 3.9 8.0 3.6 4.2 7.6 11.5 11.2 22.7 
2000 10.1 13.4 23.5 8.3 9.3 17.6 13.1 10.1 23.2 4.7 4.5 9.2 2.6 0.1 2.7 11.2 9.8 21.0 
2001 7.2 10.1 17.3 9.1 5.3 14.4 10.9 8.2 19.1 1.8 1.2 3.0 1.7 1.4 3.1 10.2 7.5 17.7 
Source: CERT Regional Data Base, authors’ calculations;  In=hiring rate; Out=separation rate; Total=turnover rate. 
Table 2a: Hiring and Separation Rates (in %), 1997-2002  
  Service staff   Engineers  
Production 
workers  Accountants  Managers All Employment
Year                   
               
In Out Total  In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total In Out Total
1997 13.7 14.2 27.8 7.8 7.8 15.5 16.4 15.2 31.5 19.1 23.5 42.6 10.8 9.9 20.7 13.9 13.2 27.1 
1998              
                   
                     
                    
                      
13.3 13.3 26.5 6.3 5.8 12.1 18.0 16.1 34.1 20.0 23.1 43.1 16.1 13.4 29.5 14.7 13.5 28.2 
1999 7.6 5.7 13.3 5.3 4.9 10.3 11.8 11.8 23.7 11.1 14.3 25.4 4.3 4.3 8.7 9.6 9.5 19.1 
2000 9.3 7.4 16.7 6.4 5.7 12.1 10.7 7.6 18.3 8.2 0.0 8.2 3.5 0.0 3.5 9.2 6.7 15.9 
2001 7.8 6.8 14.6 5.7 5.1 10.8 11.5 7.4 19.0 13.6 19.7 33.3 5.0 1.7 6.7 9.6 6.5 16.2 
2002 5.4 3.6 9.0  2.9 3.0 5.9 8.7 7.8 16.5 8.1 9.7 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 6.1 12.8 
 Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations; In=hiring rate; Out=separation rate; Total=turnover rate. 
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Table 3: Determinants of exit rates, Estimates of Cox proportional hazard model 
    Entire period 1997-1999 2000-2002 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure        
 less than 1 year -0.673*** -0.694*** -1.020*** -1.049*** 0.046 0.028 
  [0.185] [0.185] [0.239] [0.240] [0.292] [0.293] 
 1-2 years -0.370** -0.381** -0.552** -0.572** 0.079 0.077 
  [0.180] [0.181] [0.231] [0.232] [0.289] [0.290] 
 2-3 years -0.137 -0.145 -0.212 -0.229 0.155 0.158 
  [0.178] [0.179] [0.228] [0.229] [0.286] [0.287] 
 3-4 years -0.138 -0.138 -0.014 -0.026 -0.342 -0.328 
  [0.179] [0.179] [0.227] [0.227] [0.296] [0.297] 
 4-5 years -0.253 -0.256 -0.295 -0.311 -0.355 -0.331 
  [0.184] [0.184] [0.237] [0.238] [0.292] [0.293] 
 5-6 years 0.15 0.143 0.276 0.253 -0.34 -0.307 
  [0.182] [0.182] [0.233] [0.233] [0.293] [0.293] 
 6-7 years 0.154 0.155 0.29 0.282 -0.319 -0.295 
  [0.188] [0.188] [0.244] [0.244] [0.297] [0.297] 
 7-8 years 0.117 0.119 0.395 0.398 -0.426 -0.41 
  [0.196] [0.196] [0.249] [0.249] [0.318] [0.318] 
 8-9 years 0.228 0.232 0.244 0.254 0.16 0.157 
  [0.202] [0.202] [0.265] [0.266] [0.315] [0.315] 
 10-15 years -0.212 -0.208 -0.207 -0.212 -0.206 -0.166 
  [0.189] [0.189] [0.241] [0.241] [0.306] [0.306] 
 15-20 years 0.021 0.017 -0.124 -0.131 0.278 0.306 
  [0.197] [0.197] [0.250] [0.251] [0.323] [0.323] 
 20-25 years -0.16 -0.187 -0.059 -0.088 -0.518 -0.523 
  [0.218] [0.218] [0.268] [0.268] [0.396] [0.397] 
 25-30 years -0.583** -0.613** -0.720* -0.764** -0.265 -0.281 
  [0.293] [0.293] [0.376] [0.376] [0.468] [0.468] 
 30-35 years -0.259 -0.306 -1.06 -1.121 0.265 0.249 
  [0.366] [0.366] [0.749] [0.750] [0.455] [0.455] 
 35-40 years -1.326 -1.322 -0.369 -0.351   
  [1.021] [1.021] [1.042] [1.042]   
Education:        
 Basic professional 0.457*** 0.456*** 0.15 0.141 1.104*** 1.108*** 
  [0.081] [0.081] [0.098] [0.098] [0.149] [0.149] 
 Secondary general 0.08 0.099 -0.009 0.004 0.330** 0.349** 
  [0.085] [0.085] [0.100] [0.101] [0.162] [0.162] 
 Secondary professional 0.463*** 0.490*** 0.156 0.184* 1.037*** 1.058*** 
  [0.085] [0.085] [0.105] [0.105] [0.153] [0.153] 
 Higher incomplete 0.205 0.254 -0.194 -0.129 1.069*** 1.088*** 
  [0.218] [0.218] [0.292] [0.293] [0.334] [0.334] 
 Higher 0.309*** 0.326*** -0.024 -0.002 0.956*** 0.970*** 
  [0.115] [0.116] [0.146] [0.147] [0.194] [0.195] 
Age        
 less than 20 -0.115 -0.091 1.384*** 1.420***   
  [0.326] [0.326] [0.335] [0.335]   
 20-25 -0.185* -0.208* 0.111 0.082 -1.055*** -1.073*** 
  [0.112] [0.112] [0.131] [0.131] [0.220] [0.221] 
 25-30 0.072 0.065 0.023 0.021 0.231* 0.188 
  [0.081] [0.081] [0.103] [0.103] [0.134] [0.134] 
 35-40 -0.284*** -0.273*** -0.15 -0.131 -0.484*** -0.491*** 
  [0.091] [0.091] [0.115] [0.115] [0.150] [0.150] 
 40-45 -0.341*** -0.331*** -0.250** -0.235** -0.458*** -0.476*** 
  [0.093] [0.094] [0.118] [0.119] [0.151] [0.151] 
 45-50 -0.613*** -0.617*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.922*** -0.957*** 
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  [0.100] [0.100] [0.126] [0.126] [0.164] [0.164] 
 50-55 -0.776*** -0.769*** -0.690*** -0.657*** -0.923*** -0.956*** 
  [0.122] [0.123] [0.180] [0.181] [0.170] [0.170] 
 55-60 -0.294* -0.287* 0.154 0.164 -0.770*** -0.794*** 
  [0.168] [0.168] [0.227] [0.227] [0.253] [0.253] 
 60 or older  1.272*** 1.189*** 1.848*** 1.749*** 0.669** 0.573** 
  [0.190] [0.191] [0.281] [0.284] [0.264] [0.265] 
Service staff  -0.531*** -0.531*** -0.537*** -0.512*** -0.309* -0.361** 
  [0.111] [0.111] [0.142] [0.143] [0.175] [0.176] 
Engineers  -1.121*** -1.106*** -1.170*** -1.148*** -0.765*** -0.772*** 
  [0.090] [0.091] [0.120] [0.121] [0.140] [0.140] 
Accountants  -0.221 -0.184 -0.124 -0.07 -0.272 -0.261 
  [0.152] [0.152] [0.188] [0.189] [0.258] [0.258] 
Managers  -0.767*** -0.767*** -0.198 -0.203 -2.602*** -2.598*** 
  [0.193] [0.194] [0.211] [0.212] [0.719] [0.720] 
1 if female  0.494*** 0.419*** 0.650*** 0.556*** 0.301*** 0.241** 
  [0.055] [0.059] [0.069] [0.075] [0.092] [0.097] 
1 if married  -0.128 -0.103 0.018 0.028 -0.472* -0.458* 
  [0.158] [0.158] [0.198] [0.199] [0.264] [0.264] 
1 if divorced or widowed -0.469** -0.422** -0.695*** -0.659** -0.386 -0.37 
  [0.191] [0.192] [0.259] [0.260] [0.296] [0.297] 
1 if 1 child  -0.488*** -0.500*** -0.517*** -0.526*** -0.377* -0.366 
  [0.128] [0.128] [0.155] [0.156] [0.225] [0.225] 
1 if more than 1 child -0.691*** -0.695*** -0.963*** -0.965*** -0.156 -0.146 
  [0.146] [0.146] [0.183] [0.184] [0.248] [0.248] 
Position in employee category specific wage distribution:       
 1st decile  0.431***  0.433***  0.411** 
   [0.108]  [0.130]  [0.193] 
 2nd decile  -0.014  -0.028  -0.01 
   [0.118]  [0.142]  [0.215] 
 3rd decile  0.115  0.159  -0.089 
   [0.117]  [0.139]  [0.221] 
 4th decile  0.000  -0.022  0.048 
   [0.124]  [0.151]  [0.218] 
 6th decile  0.094  0.005  0.331 
   [0.120]  [0.146]  [0.212] 
 7th decile  -0.084  0.036  -0.502** 
   [0.128]  [0.150]  [0.253] 
 8th decile  -0.375***  -0.349**  -0.461* 
   [0.139]  [0.164]  [0.272] 
 9th decile  -0.046  -0.132  0.019 
   [0.136]  [0.168]  [0.231] 
 10th decile  0.366***  0.352**  0.303 
      [0.120]   [0.144]   [0.222] 
Observations 201659 201659 98736 98736 113100 113100 
Standard errors in brackets       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 4: Determinants of wages, 1997 
 Dependent Variable: log(real wage) in 1997 
 All employees 
Service 
staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure in years 0.028*** 0.020 0.026* 0.030*** 0.027 0.007 
 [0.007] [0.028] [0.014] [0.010] [0.041] [0.026] 
Tenure squared/100 in years -0.136** -0.269 -0.188 -0.119 -0.471 0.021 
 [0.067] [0.251] [0.134] [0.089] [0.481] [0.237] 
Tenure cube /1000 in years 0.025 0.083 0.04 0.014 0.171 -0.007 
 [0.016] [0.055] [0.033] [0.021] [0.152] [0.058] 
Age in years 0.034 0.013 0.012 -0.005 -0.479 -0.588 
 [0.038] [0.176] [0.074] [0.049] [0.290] [0.424] 
Age squared/100 in years -0.033 -0.009 -0.001 0.08 1.579* 1.541 
 [0.103] [0.469] [0.198] [0.133] [0.819] [1.059] 
Age cube /1000 in years -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.01 -0.162** -0.131 
 [0.009] [0.041] [0.017] [0.012] [0.075] [0.087] 
Basic professional 0.037 0.014  0.036   
 [0.029] [0.087]  [0.033]   
Secondary general 0.079*** -0.027  0.076**   
 [0.028] [0.089]  [0.032]   
Secondary professional 0.097*** 0.028 -0.123 0.100*** 0.615  
 [0.030] [0.104] [0.277] [0.036] [0.390]  
Higher incomplete 0.164** -0.088 -0.065 0.180 1.406** 0.035 
 [0.069] [0.469] [0.284] [0.114] [0.559] [0.167] 
Higher 0.122*** 0.187 -0.073 0.110 0.977** -0.042 
 [0.038] [0.273] [0.277] [0.069] [0.396] [0.053] 
1 if female -0.319*** -0.236*** -0.155*** -0.428*** 0.584** -0.044 
 [0.019] [0.071] [0.030] [0.027] [0.284] [0.060] 
1 if single 0.021 0.476 -0.038 0.074 0.109  
 [0.070] [0.467] [0.167] [0.093] [0.236]  
1 if divorced or widowed -0.009 0.014 -0.081 -0.005 0.004 -0.056 
 [0.035] [0.093] [0.074] [0.050] [0.132] [0.071] 
1 if 1 child -0.011 0.434 -0.064 0.035 0.078 0.418 
 [0.053] [0.507] [0.086] [0.071] [0.207] [0.253] 
1 if more than 1 child 0.042 0.487 -0.055 0.080 0.052 0.444* 
 [0.057] [0.498] [0.096] [0.076] [0.236] [0.254] 
Service staff -0.731***      
 [0.034]      
Engineers -0.064**      
 [0.030]      
Accountants 0.401***      
 [0.060]      
Managers 0.662***      
 [0.051]      
Constant -0.622 -1.281 -0.015 -0.252 3.422 7.886 
  [0.456] [2.150] [0.924] [0.583] [3.383] [5.539] 
Observations 3040 213 790 1838 76 123 
R-squared 0.35 0.1 0.06 0.24 0.49 0.16 
OLS Estimates. Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 5: Shares of Monthly Compensation Components 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra Bonus Other Bonus 
1997 0.830 0.080 0.051 0.039 
1998 0.916 0.059 0.000 0.025 
1999 0.870 0.066 0.043 0.021 
2000 0.854 0.066 0.042 0.038 
2001 0.797 0.081 0.098 0.025 
2002 0.776 0.095 0.088 0.041 
   Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Transition probabilities between quintiles of real wages in 1997 and 2002 
(in %); all continuous employees 
 
  Quintile in real wage distribution (2002)   
   1 2 3 4 5 N (1997) 
1 57.89 30.47 8.59 1.39 1.66 361 
2 28.5 34.35 25 10.28 1.87 428 
3 4.81 19.24 34.87 35.27 5.81 499 
4 0.73 5.13 12.96 49.39 31.78 409 
Q
ui
nt
ile
 in
 re
al
 
w
ag
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
(1
99
7)
 
5 0 0.49 4.62 22.38 72.51 411 
  Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7: Real wage growth 1997-2002 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Tenure in years -0.038*** -0.029*** -0.020** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] 
Tenure squared/100 in years 0.160** 0.155*** 0.101** 
 [0.077] [0.053] [0.052] 
Tenure cube /1000 in years -0.022* -0.022** -0.013 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] 
Age in years 0.04 -0.001 -0.016 
 [0.052] [0.036] [0.034] 
Age squared/100 in years -0.119 -0.005 0.039 
 [0.124] [0.086] [0.081] 
Age cube /1000 in years 0.011 0.000 -0.003 
 [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] 
Basic professional 0.000 -0.008 0.000 
 [0.028] [0.019] [0.019] 
Secondary general -0.012 0.024 0.016 
 [0.024] [0.017] [0.016] 
Secondary professional 0.032 0.097*** 0.037** 
 [0.023] [0.016] [0.019] 
Higher incomplete 0.056 0.144*** 0.066* 
 [0.057] [0.039] [0.040] 
Higher 0.023 0.131*** 0.047** 
 [0.024] [0.017] [0.022] 
1 if female 0.087*** -0.035*** -0.050*** 
 [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] 
1 if single -0.061 -0.045 -0.057 
 [0.080] [0.055] [0.053] 
1 if divorced or widowed -0.015 -0.043** -0.044** 
 [0.027] [0.019] [0.018] 
1 if 1 child 0.098 0.056 0.045 
 [0.062] [0.043] [0.041] 
1 if more than 1 child 0.063 0.059 0.047 
 [0.064] [0.044] [0.042] 
Position in firm-level wage distribution:    
1st decile  0.563***  
  [0.022]  
2nd decile  0.218***  
  [0.024]  
3rd decile  0.119***  
  [0.023]  
4th decile  0.033  
  [0.023]  
6th decile  -0.098***  
  [0.022]  
7th decile  -0.090***  
  [0.023]  
8th decile  -0.184***  
  [0.024]  
9th decile  -0.195***  
  [0.023]  
10th decile  -0.304***  
  [0.024]  
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Position in employee category specific wage 
distribution:    
1st decile   0.559*** 
   [0.021] 
2nd decile   0.251*** 
   [0.020] 
3rd decile   0.183*** 
   [0.022] 
4th decile   0.134*** 
   [0.020] 
6th decile   0.01 
   [0.022] 
7th decile   -0.088*** 
   [0.021] 
8th decile   -0.193*** 
   [0.022] 
9th decile   -0.154*** 
   [0.020] 
10th decile   -0.291*** 
   [0.021] 
Service staff   0.286*** 
   [0.018] 
Engineers   0.151*** 
   [0.018] 
Accountants   -0.078** 
   [0.039] 
Managers   -0.089*** 
   [0.028] 
Constant -0.425 -0.056 0.015 
  [0.699] [0.482] [0.459] 
Observations 1824 1824 1824 
R-squared 0.07 0.56 0.61 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Service staff Engineers
Production 
workers Accountants Managers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tenure in years -0.143** 0.013 -0.027** -0.239 -0.025
[0.069] [0.011] [0.013] [0.157] [0.024]
Tenure squared/100 in years 0.982* -0.082 0.141* 1.683 0.093
[0.553] [0.066] [0.075] [1.089] [0.142]
Tenure cube /1000 in years -0.209 0.015 -0.019 -0.335 -0.008
[0.134] [0.012] [0.013] [0.231] [0.025]
Age in years -0.234 -0.02 0.046 -0.532 0.914*
[0.148] [0.033] [0.055] [1.170] [0.468]
Age squared/100 in years 0.55 0.042 -0.103 1.08 -1.978*
[0.348] [0.076] [0.132] [2.834] [1.029]
Age cube /1000 in years -0.042 -0.003 0.007 -0.071 0.141*
[0.027] [0.006] [0.010] [0.225] [0.075]
Basic professional 0.058 -0.460*** -0.018
[0.050] [0.146] [0.023]
Secondary general 0.004 -0.001
[0.052] [0.019]
Secondary professional 0.057 -0.012 0.028 0.172 -0.066
[0.063] [0.026] [0.024] [0.447] [0.068]
Higher incomplete -0.029 0.053 -0.011
[0.235] [0.103] [0.813]
Higher 0.125 -0.005 -0.039 0.337 -0.025
[0.163] [0.026] [0.047] [0.483] [0.068]
1 if female -0.036 0.006 -0.111*** -0.29 -0.015
[0.041] [0.011] [0.021] [0.427] [0.028]
1 if single -0.247 0.031 0.139
[0.230] [0.075] [0.087]
1 if divorced or widowed -0.101* -0.016 -0.025 -0.441** 0.002
[0.056] [0.029] [0.026] [0.192] [0.028]
1 if 1 child -0.066 -0.028 0.232*** 0.067 -0.013
[0.051] [0.035] [0.073] [0.166] [0.020]
1 if more than 1 child -0.012 0.219***
[0.039] [0.074]
Position in employee category 
specific wage distribution:
1st decile 0.617*** 0.403*** 0.674*** 0.466 0.419***
[0.085] [0.022] [0.032] [0.294] [0.041]
2nd decile 0.287*** 0.213*** 0.270*** 0.264 0.278***
[0.080] [0.022] [0.029] [0.275] [0.047]
3rd decile -0.037 0.161*** 0.202*** -0.003 0.254***
[0.082] [0.022] [0.034] [0.363] [0.043]
4th decile 0.259*** 0.085*** 0.137*** 0.052 0.103**
[0.088] [0.022] [0.030] [0.286] [0.043]
6th decile -0.083 -0.087*** 0.086** 0.107 -0.147***
[0.083] [0.023] [0.035] [0.310] [0.045]
7th decile -0.314*** -0.140*** -0.033 -0.175 -0.116***
[0.084] [0.022] [0.031] [0.262] [0.043]
8th decile -0.550*** -0.186*** -0.162*** -0.043 -0.123***
[0.085] [0.023] [0.034] [0.344] [0.039]
9th decile -0.621*** -0.189*** -0.086*** 0.042 -0.158***
[0.084] [0.022] [0.030] [0.274] [0.050]
10th decile -0.761*** -0.287*** -0.241*** -0.096 -0.268***
[0.084] [0.023] [0.032] [0.295] [0.044]
Constant 4.054* 0.224 -1.018 8.929 -14.044**
[2.070] [0.438] [0.733] [16.054] [7.005]
Observations 151 611 934 36 92
R-squared 0.83 0.75 0.53 0.69 0.9
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Real wage growth 1997-2002 by employee category
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Table 9: Differences between average wages in firm and average wages in sample of 
industrial firms in the region in 1997 rubles: 1998-2002 
  
Year Service 
workers 
Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
      
1998 100 133 379 792 1468 
1999 346 391 803 805 1898 
2000 123 -28 261 223 1056 
2001 81 -82 195 279 805 
2002 -61 -24 119 150 551 
  Source: Personnel records of the firm and CERT Regional Data Base, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 10: Summary statistics of real wage arrears for 1998 by employee type in 
thousands of Rubles (A) and in months of 1997 wages (B) 
 
Type N mean Std. dev. 50% 75% 90% max 
All employees        
A 3408 0.099 0.198 0 0.120 0.273 2.786 
B 3395 0.078 0.130 0 0.116 0.313 1.140 
Service workers        
A 237 0.088 0.041 0.094 0.110 0.131 0.210 
B 236 0.130 0.051 0.136 0.139 0.194 0.298 
Engineers        
A 786 0.112 0.070 0.120 0.168 0.210 0.630 
B 779 0.116 0.046 0.115 0.116 0.162 0.670 
Workers        
A 2179 0.073 0.212 0 0 0.368 1.840 
B 2175 0.051 0.142 0 0 0.333 0.907 
Accountants        
A 76 0.436 0.270 0.488 0.625 0.757 0.893 
B 75 0.309 0.201 0.371 0.373 0.447 1.140 
Managers        
A 130 0.187 0.322 0.160 0.189 0.199 2.786 
B 130 0.066 0.112 0.055 0.056 0.056 0.670 
Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 11: Tobit regressions with dependent variables: real wage arrears for 1998  
in thousands of Rubles and in months of 1997 wages 
regressor Dependent variable 
 real arrears real arrears real arrears /  
monthly 97 wages 
real arrears / 
monthly 97 wages 
constant 0.055 
(0.018)* 
0.024 
(0.026) 
0.067 
(0.011)* 
0.140 
(0.017)* 
real wage -0.037 
(0.011)* 
0.051 
(0.015)* 
-0.089 
(0.007)* 
-0.039 
(0.010)* 
engineers  0.030 
(0.028) 
 0.010 
(0.018) 
workers  -0.405 
(0.031)* 
 -0.272 
(0.020)* 
accountants  0.293 
(0.050)* 
 0.199 
(0.033)* 
managers  -0.037 
(0.053) 
 0.002 
(0.035) 
Diagnostics N=3395 
Chi2(1)=10.22 
Pseudo R2=0.002 
N=3395 
Chi2(5)=846.88 
Pseudo R2=0.234 
N=3395 
Chi2(1)=129.73 
Pseudo R2=0.049 
N=3395 
Chi2(5)=997.07 
Pseudo R2=0.377 
 Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
Table 12: Evolution of earnings inequality measured by Gini coefficients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel a: Wages 
Year 
Entire 
workforce 
Service 
staff Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1997 0.2801 0.2474 0.2294 0.2507 0.1912 0.1367 
1998 0.251 0.1484 0.2239 0.2003 0.1417 0.1082 
1999 0.2453 0.0853 0.1954 0.1854 0.1267 0.1202 
2000 0.2456 0.0649 0.1786 0.1945 0.1705 0.072 
2001 0.2189 0.055 0.1679 0.1792 0.1583 0.0438 
2002 0.1995 0.1618 0.1437 0.1725 0.1409 0.0482 
       
       
Panel b: Total compensation 
Year 
Entire 
workforce 
Service 
staff Engineers Workers Accountants Managers 
1997 0.2928 0.2416 0.2293 0.2456 0.1903 0.1488 
1998 0.2547 0.1474 0.2248 0.2015 0.1423 0.1077 
1999 0.2444 0.0855 0.1964 0.1823 0.131 0.1202 
2000 0.2464 0.0669 0.1792 0.1972 0.1787 0.073 
2001 0.2271 0.0684 0.1681 0.1778 0.1696 0.0447 
2002 0.2211 0.162 0.1455 0.1845 0.1454 0.0484 
  Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 13: Gini decomposition by income source 
 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra 
Bonus 
Other 
Bonus 
 
Gini by income source
1997 0.2802 0.8069 0.63 0.725 
1998 0.251 0.7933 - 0.7027 
1999 0.2453 0.7846 0.5467 0.7788 
2000 0.2457 0.7759 0.5488 0.7271 
2001 0.219 0.7658 0.352 0.7367 
2002 0.1996 0.758 0.2724 0.7209 
 
Gini correlation of income source with distribution of total income
1997 0.9752 0.6052 0.5787 0.2968 
1998 0.9893 0.4063 - 0.4621 
1999 0.9895 0.2838 0.5298 0.371 
2000 0.9775 0.3499 0.3805 0.5315 
2001 0.9711 0.5007 0.6761 0.192 
2002 0.9586 0.5955 0.8062 0.3527 
   Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 14: Contributions of source incomes on inequality 
 
Year Monthly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Bonus 
Extra 
Bonus 
Other 
Bonus 
 
Share of source income in total inequality
1997 0.7749 0.1333 0.063 0.0288 
1998 0.8929 0.0756 - 0.0315 
1999 0.8643 0.06 0.0513 0.0245 
2000 0.8324 0.0731 0.0354 0.0591 
2001 0.7462 0.1364 0.1021 0.0153 
2002 0.6707 0.1947 0.0875 0.047 
 
Inequality components as a fraction of income shares
1997 0.9333 1.6677 1.2451 0.7349 
1998 0.9748 1.2748 - 1.275 
1999 0.9932 0.911 1.185 1.1823 
2000 0.9745 1.1016 0.8473 1.5682 
2001 0.936 1.6878 1.0476 0.6227 
2002 0.8649 2.041 0.9928 1.1495 
 
Impact of 1% change in income source on inequality 
1997 -0.0554 0.0534 0.0124 -0.0104 
1998 -0.0231 0.0163 - 0.0068 
1999 -0.0059 -0.0059 0.008 0.0038 
2000 -0.0218 0.0067 -0.0064 0.0214 
2001 -0.051 0.0556 0.0046 -0.0093 
2002 -0.1048 0.0993 -0.0006 0.0061 
    Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 58
 
 
Table 15: General Entropy Index (GEI) and its decomposition into within 
and between parts 
        
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
Panel a: Wages
Year GEI(-1)  GEI(+1) 
  Total Within Between   Total Within Between 
        
1997 0.1904 0.1515 0.0389  0.1263 0.0914 0.0348 
1998 0.1379 0.097 0.0409  0.1001 0.0637 0.0363 
1999 0.1151 0.07 0.0451  0.0958 0.0538 0.042 
2000 0.1082 0.0626 0.0456  0.0938 0.0539 0.0399 
2001 0.095 0.0528 0.0421  0.076 0.0444 0.0315 
2002 0.0762 0.0544 0.0217  0.0645 0.0399 0.0245 
        
Panel b: Total compensation
Year GEI(-1)  GEI(+1) 
  Total Within Between   Total Within Between 
        
1997 0.195 0.1453 0.0497  0.1446 0.086 0.0348 
1998 0.1379 0.0976 0.0402  0.1061 0.0636 0.0363 
1999 0.1144 0.0688 0.0456  0.0991 0.0525 0.042 
2000 0.1086 0.0651 0.0434  0.0987 0.0546 0.0399 
2001 0.1017 0.0554 0.0462  0.0853 0.0435 0.0315 
2002 0.0941 0.0636 0.0304   0.0826 0.0433 0.0245 
   Source: Personnel records of the firm, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 59
     Appendix 
Table A1: Determinants of wages, 2002 
 Dependent Variable: log(real wage) in 2002 
 All employees Service staff Engineers 
Production 
workers Accountants Managers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Tenure in years 0.010** 0.04 0.035*** 0.003 0.027 0.002 
 [0.004] [0.026] [0.009] [0.006] [0.028] [0.013] 
Tenure squared/100 in years -0.039 -0.534* -0.174*** 0.008 -0.184 -0.049 
 [0.033] [0.287] [0.063] [0.043] [0.261] [0.081] 
Tenure cube /1000 in years 0.008 0.158* 0.027** 0.000 0.045 0.015 
 [0.007] [0.087] [0.013] [0.009] [0.069] [0.015] 
Age in years 0.111*** 0.067 -0.100** 0.142*** -0.671*** 0.935*** 
 [0.022] [0.084] [0.044] [0.028] [0.232] [0.196] 
Age squared/100 in years -0.248*** -0.183 0.245** -0.319*** 1.781*** -1.935*** 
 [0.054] [0.207] [0.108] [0.070] [0.597] [0.447] 
Age cube /1000 in years 0.018*** 0.015 -0.019** 0.024*** -0.152*** 0.132*** 
 [0.004] [0.017] [0.009] [0.006] [0.050] [0.034] 
Basic professional 0.056*** 0.094 -0.406 0.033   
 [0.018] [0.059] [0.259] [0.020]   
Secondary general 0.056*** 0.062  0.041**   
 [0.017] [0.060]  [0.019]   
Secondary professional 0.087*** 0.085 -0.011 0.073*** 0.711** -0.024 
 [0.019] [0.070] [0.046] [0.022] [0.301] [0.062] 
Higher incomplete 0.096** 0.34  0.044 1.152***  
 [0.045] [0.305]  [0.080] [0.422]  
Higher 0.107*** 0.271 0.026 0.066* 0.984*** 0.002 
 [0.023] [0.218] [0.046] [0.038] [0.304] [0.061] 
1 if female -0.170*** -0.152*** -0.082*** -0.228*** 0.292 0.004 
 [0.012] [0.049] [0.018] [0.016] [0.204] [0.019] 
1 if single -0.032 -0.165 0.063 -0.073 0.153  
 [0.039] [0.307] [0.088] [0.050] [0.215]  
1 if divorced or widowed -0.072*** 0.011 -0.059 -0.085*** -0.23 -0.017 
 [0.020] [0.063] [0.051] [0.026] [0.144] [0.024] 
1 if 1 child 0.015 -0.379 0.023 0.017 0.563* -0.044 
 [0.034] [0.330] [0.052] [0.045] [0.324] [0.062] 
1 if more than 1 child 0.027 -0.388 0.084 0.014 0.568* -0.032 
 [0.037] [0.325] [0.061] [0.049] [0.331] [0.063] 
Service staff -0.516***      
 [0.021]      
Engineers -0.014      
 [0.018]      
Accountants 0.152***      
 [0.040]      
Managers 0.679***      
 [0.032]      
Constant -1.655*** -0.953 1.170** -2.032*** 6.433** -14.020*** 
  [0.269] [1.094] [0.568] [0.339] [2.807] [2.822] 
Observations 3104 213 781 1929 64 117 
R-squared 0.42 0.21 0.1 0.24 0.56 0.47 
OLS Estimates. Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
Table A2: Quantile wage regressions
10th percentile 20th percentile 30th percentile 40th percentile 50th percentile 60th percentile 70th percentile 80th percentile 90th percentile
Tenure in years 0.026 0.016 0.022* 0.025** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.024***
[0.016] [0.015] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007]
Tenure squared/100 in years -0.072 -0.003 -0.088 -0.114 -0.154* -0.169*** -0.186** -0.139** -0.121*
[0.135] [0.133] [0.108] [0.096] [0.086] [0.063] [0.075] [0.055] [0.063]
Tenure cube /1000 in years 0.01 -0.003 0.016 0.022 0.027 0.030** 0.037** 0.026** 0.018
[0.029] [0.032] [0.026] [0.023] [0.020] [0.015] [0.018] [0.013] [0.016]
Age in years 0.075 0.003 0.002 0.021 0.034 0.054 0.071 0.04 -0.006
[0.082] [0.072] [0.061] [0.055] [0.050] [0.037] [0.045] [0.033] [0.039]
Age squared/100 in years -0.136 0.048 0.055 0.014 -0.031 -0.077 -0.119 -0.051 0.064
[0.223] [0.195] [0.165] [0.149] [0.134] [0.100] [0.120] [0.089] [0.104]
Age cube /1000 in years 0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.006 0.001 -0.008
[0.019] [0.017] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.009]
Basic professional 0.077 0.092 0.03 0.026 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.027 0.016
[0.066] [0.058] [0.048] [0.042] [0.038] [0.028] [0.032] [0.023] [0.025]
Secondary general 0.203*** 0.08 0.102** 0.063 0.061* 0.028 0.038 0.066*** 0.050**
[0.064] [0.055] [0.046] [0.040] [0.036] [0.027] [0.031] [0.022] [0.024]
Secondary professional 0.266*** 0.197*** 0.108** 0.067 0.056 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.04
[0.069] [0.060] [0.049] [0.044] [0.039] [0.029] [0.034] [0.024] [0.026]
Higher incomplete 0.354** 0.191 0.176 0.118 0.135 0.089 0.099 0.130** 0.103*
[0.140] [0.132] [0.112] [0.099] [0.088] [0.065] [0.075] [0.052] [0.054]
Higher 0.151* 0.127* 0.084 0.106* 0.128*** 0.117*** 0.129*** 0.116*** 0.093***
[0.086] [0.075] [0.062] [0.055] [0.049] [0.036] [0.042] [0.029] [0.031]
1 if female -0.366*** -0.360*** -0.355*** -0.401*** -0.369*** -0.335*** -0.277*** -0.223*** -0.126***
[0.047] [0.039] [0.031] [0.027] [0.024] [0.018] [0.021] [0.015] [0.016]
1 if single -0.087 -0.008 -0.079 0.014 0.014 0.115* 0.1 0.036 0.106*
[0.153] [0.136] [0.113] [0.100] [0.090] [0.067] [0.078] [0.056] [0.061]
1 if divorced or widowed 0.097 0.052 0.025 -0.003 -0.036 -0.03 -0.06 -0.065** -0.046
[0.081] [0.069] [0.058] [0.051] [0.046] [0.034] [0.039] [0.028] [0.029]
1 if 1 child -0.078 0.023 -0.032 0 0 -0.009 -0.01 -0.035 0.015
[0.119] [0.105] [0.087] [0.077] [0.069] [0.051] [0.059] [0.043] [0.046]
1 if more than 1 child 0.002 0.137 0.046 0.056 0.07 0.046 0.017 -0.044 -0.002
[0.127] [0.113] [0.093] [0.082] [0.074] [0.055] [0.063] [0.046] [0.049]
Service staff -0.596*** -0.679*** -0.760*** -0.812*** -0.803*** -0.758*** -0.783*** -0.785*** -0.803***
[0.077] [0.066] [0.055] [0.049] [0.044] [0.032] [0.038] [0.026] [0.029]
Engineers 0.079 -0.025 -0.087* -0.085** -0.100*** -0.110*** -0.138*** -0.159*** -0.159***
[0.069] [0.059] [0.048] [0.043] [0.038] [0.028] [0.033] [0.023] [0.025]
Accountants 0.644*** 0.492*** 0.498*** 0.459*** 0.406*** 0.349*** 0.271*** 0.188*** 0.05
[0.140] [0.121] [0.099] [0.088] [0.078] [0.056] [0.065] [0.044] [0.050]
Managers 1.046*** 0.845*** 0.726*** 0.602*** 0.595*** 0.541*** 0.528*** 0.513*** 0.464***
[0.110] [0.098] [0.082] [0.073] [0.065] [0.048] [0.056] [0.040] [0.042]
Constant -1.895** -0.679 -0.375 -0.504 -0.526 -0.672 -0.76 -0.196 0.452
[0.964] [0.844] [0.724] [0.655] [0.589] [0.440] [0.528] [0.392] [0.461]
Observations 3040 3040 3040 3040 3040 3040 3040 3040 3040
Quantile regression estimates. Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: log(real wage) in 1997
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Table A.3 Wage Growth Regressions – Heckit model 
(1) (2) (3)
 Real Wage Growth Selection Equation Real Wage Growth Selection Equation Real Wage Growth Selection Equation 
Tenure in years -0.053***  -0.005  -0.009*  
 [0.007]      
      
      
      
      
      
       
      
       
      
       
      
       
      
  
      
      
      
      
        
      
      
[0.005] [0.005]
Tenure squared/100 in years 
 
0.347***  0.051  0.07  
[0.064] [0.042] [0.045]
Tenure cube /1000 in years 
 
-0.064***  -0.009  -0.012  
[0.015] [0.010] [0.010]
Age in years 
 
-0.003  0.03  0.004  
[0.042] [0.028] [0.027]
Age squared/100 in years 
 
0.011  -0.099  -0.015  
[0.113] [0.076] [0.073]
Age cube /1000 in years 
 
-0.001  0.01  0.001  
[0.010] [0.007] [0.006]
Basic professional
 
-0.124*** -0.452*** 0.017 -0.451*** 0.003 -0.449***
[0.031] [0.082] [0.020] [0.085] [0.022] [0.086]
Secondary general
 
-0.015 -0.063 0.02 0.009 0.012 0.012
[0.027] [0.077] [0.017] [0.082] [0.016] [0.082]
Secondary professional
 
0.050** -0.194** 0.114*** -0.387*** 0.041** -0.355***
[0.026] [0.077] [0.016] [0.088] [0.021] [0.090]
Higher incomplete
 
0.09 -0.139 0.123*** -0.312 0.063 -0.245
[0.064] [0.183] [0.040] [0.205] [0.040] [0.207]
Higher
 
0.080*** -0.075 0.138*** -0.398*** 0.056** -0.327***
[0.028] [0.093] [0.017] [0.111] [0.024] [0.113]
1 if female 
 
0.008 -0.166*** -0.024* -0.547*** -0.036** -0.533*** 
[0.018] [0.054] [0.012] [0.058] [0.015] [0.059]
1 if single 
 
-0.058 -0.035 -0.047 0.133 -0.052 0.114 
[0.082] [0.202] [0.054] [0.213] [0.052] [0.212]
1 if divorced or widowed 
 
0.071** 0.444*** -0.056*** 0.528*** -0.051** 0.496*** 
[0.032] [0.100] [0.020] [0.108] [0.020] [0.109]
1 if 1 child
 
0.261*** 0.596*** 0.004 0.655*** 0.045 0.646***
[0.064] [0.156] [0.043] [0.165] [0.044] [0.165]
1 if more than 1 child 
 
0.252*** 0.800*** 0.001 0.900*** 0.045 0.879*** 
[0.067] [0.165] [0.045] [0.177] [0.047] [0.176]
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     [0.024]  
        
     [0.022]  
        
     [0.021]  
        
     [0.022]  
        
     [0.022]  
        
     [0.020]  
        
     [0.020]  
        
     [0.022]  
Position in firm-level wage distribution:
  1st decile -1.302*** 0.670*** -0.346*** -0.394***
[0.098] [0.026] [0.116] [0.133]
2nd decile  -0.626*** 0.267*** -0.001  -0.08 
[0.088] [0.023] [0.113] [0.114]
3rd decile -0.301*** 0.080*** -0.057 -0.129
[0.081] [0.023] [0.109] [0.114]
4th decile -0.087 -0.005 -0.028 -0.108
[0.078] [0.023] [0.108] [0.115]
6th decile 0.327*** -0.160*** 0.250** 0.242**
[0.074] [0.021] [0.103] [0.109]
7th decile 0.258*** -0.165*** 0.270** 0.307**
[0.085] [0.024] [0.120] [0.120]
8th decile 0.384*** -0.257*** -0.027 -0.014
[0.078] [0.023] [0.111] [0.113]
9th decile 0.367*** -0.245*** 0.004 0.087
[0.078] [0.023] [0.115] [0.113]
10th decile  0.381*** -0.345*** -0.386***  -0.305** 
[0.081] [0.024] [0.122] [0.122]
Position in employee category specific 
wage distribution: 
1st decile 0.569***
2nd decile 0.291***
3rd decile 0.158***
4th decile 0.118***
6th decile -0.057***
7th decile -0.113***
8th decile -0.204***
9th decile -0.234***
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     [0.022]  
        
      
       
      
       
      
       
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
10th decile -0.300***
Service staff
 
0.712*** 0.329*** 0.223*** 0.583***
[0.078] [0.109] [0.019] [0.103]
Engineers
 
0.218*** 1.016*** 0.082*** 1.045***
[0.072] [0.092] [0.027] [0.091]
Accountants
 
0.045 0.274* -0.124*** 0.269
[0.105] [0.161] [0.039] [0.169]
Managers
 
0.086 1.020*** -0.092*** 0.753***
[0.115] [0.158] [0.029] [0.166]
ten1 -0.490*** -0.757*** -0.673***
[0.076] [0.100] [0.108]
ten2 -0.631*** -0.994*** -0.939***
[0.081] [0.101] [0.114]
ten3 -0.566*** -0.660*** -0.615***
[0.079] [0.095] [0.099]
ten4 -0.932*** -1.195*** -1.180***
[0.092] [0.112] [0.118]
ten5 -0.961*** -1.319*** -1.258***
[0.114] [0.149] [0.157]
ten6 -1.153*** -1.407*** -1.417***
[0.104] [0.127] [0.131]
ten7 -0.825*** -0.789*** -0.804***
[0.123] [0.145] [0.151]
ten8 -0.896*** -0.969*** -0.905***
[0.129] [0.162] [0.171]
ten9 -0.678*** -0.734*** -0.618***
[0.168] [0.206] [0.219]
ten10_ -0.798*** -0.763*** -0.709***
[0.101] [0.115] [0.120]
ten15_ -0.865*** -0.761*** -0.731***
[0.105] [0.123] [0.126]
ten20_ -0.732*** -0.883*** -0.816***
[0.116] [0.140] [0.148]
ten25_ -0.768*** -0.706*** -0.628***
[0.147] [0.180] [0.188]
ten30_ -0.789** 0.091 0.213
 64 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
      
       
       
        
       
[0.388] [0.498] [0.518]
ten35 -1.126*** -0.448 -0.479
[0.435] [0.518] [0.537]
old15_ -0.271 -0.790** -0.771*
[0.294] [0.394] [0.410]
old20_ -0.032 -0.093 -0.08
[0.088] [0.101] [0.104]
old25_ 0 -0.071 -0.061
[0.065] [0.083] [0.087]
old35_ 0.148** 0.221** 0.240***
[0.066] [0.087] [0.091]
old40_ 0.182*** 0.240*** 0.228**
[0.070] [0.086] [0.089]
old45_ 0.310*** 0.430*** 0.434***
[0.079] [0.093] [0.095]
old50_ 0.285*** 0.348*** 0.363***
[0.102] [0.123] [0.128]
old55 -0.157 -0.415** -0.408**
[0.143] [0.177] [0.180]
Constant
 
-0.472 0.216 -0.323 0.369* -0.204 0.301
[0.494] [0.189] [0.327] [0.209] [0.312] [0.213]
Lambda     0.369***  -  0.122***  -0.033  
[0.011] [0.021] [0.034]
Observations 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
 
